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INDIA’S NUCLEAR CIVIL LIABILITY BILL AND
SUPPLIER’S LIABILITY: ONE STEP TOWARDS
MODERNIZING THE OUTDATED INTERNATIONAL
NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME
ARYA HARIHARAN*
INTRODUCTION
Energy is the workhorse of any society and the backbone of the
global economy.1 The nuclear industry, in particular, is a marvel of human
innovation, but such technological marvel does not give the industry carte
blanche to mature without a system of checks and balances in place.
The nuclear industry has grown accustomed to the practice of
having all liability channeled to the nuclear operator and no liability suf-
fered by the various nuclear suppliers,2 regardless of fault.3 With the rise
of new global powers, such as India, the nuclear industry and its traditional
sovereign supporters find themselves coveting access to lucrative new mar-
kets not willing to completely absolve the foreign players of liability in the
event of a nuclear accident.4 On August 30, 2010, India passed the Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill.5 Because India is not a signatory of the
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, College of William & Mary School of Law. B.A., 2007, Law &
Society; Minor International Studies, American University. I would like to send my heart-
felt thanks to my wonderful parents, Dr. Narayanan & Mrs. Sheela Hariharan, for their
high expectations and unwavering support, and to my brother, Girish Hariharan, for his
unintended comic relief. I want to thank the great group of people at the William & Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review for all their hard work in preparing this Note for
publication. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and loved ones for tolerating me while
I worked through the stress of law school and Note writing.
1 See David A. Bagely, The United States and International Civil Liability, 18 BROOK. J.
INT’L. L. 497, 497 (1992) (explaining the power and fragility of nuclear energy).
2 The term “suppliers” in this Note encompasses nuclear manufacturers, contractors,
carriers, designers, and any other third parties involved in the creation and establish-
ment of a nuclear installation, prior to ownership being transferred to the nuclear operator.
3 See infra Part I.
4 See Jayshree Bajoria, India’s Nuclear Liability Dilemma, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/indiasnuclear-liability
-dilemma/p23305.
5 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, No. 19 of 2010, INDIA CODE (2010).
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Non-Proliferation Treaty,6 Paris Convention,7 or other major international
nuclear regimes,8 the Indian government felt it necessary for the country
to have a viable nuclear liability regime in case of nuclear disaster.9 The
new law allows for negligent nuclear suppliers to be exposed to liability,
much to the consternation of foreign nuclear players.10
India’s new legislation has faced much criticism in the West, but
as this Note will attempt to prove, moving away from legal channeling
and, instead, subjecting suppliers to third-party liability claims is the
next logical direction for the outdated nuclear liability regime. Channeling
liability solely to the operator is a means of protecting powerful nuclear
suppliers from liability claims.11 Contrary to popular belief, this is at the
expense of the victims, the greater public, and the environment, because
suppliers have no real incentive to ensure the safety and longevity of their
goods and services.12 In addition, it is very difficult for plaintiffs to collect
sufficient damages.13
Part I will delve into the inception of legal and economic channeling
of liability to the nuclear operator and the current regime’s justifications
for such a doctrine.14 Part II will discuss the various international nuclear
liability damage regimes and how they channel liability solely to the nu-
clear operators and away from any third-party suppliers.15 Part III will
briefly review how the use of liability channeling varies in different nations,
including Austria, Canada, Chile, and the United States.16 Finally, Part IV
will discuss legal channeling in the context of the Indian Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage Bill and analyze why supplier’s liability will better
serve the interests of the public and the environment.17
6 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mar. 5, 1970, 729 U.N.T.S. 161,
available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/NPTEnglish_Text.pdf
[hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty].
7 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY, July 29, 1960, available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html [herein-
after Paris Convention].
8 See infra Parts II.B–I.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See infra Part IV.A.
11 See infra Part IV.B.
12 See infra Part IV.C.
13 See infra Part IV.B.
14 See infra Part I.C.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
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While the Indian bill is not perfect by any stretch of the imagina-
tion, it is a significant step toward providing the public and the environ-
ment with greater protection by updating the nuclear liability regime to
reflect the industry’s current status as a mature industry no longer in
need of such strong liability protections.
I. CHANNELING LIABILITY TO THE NUCLEAR OPERATOR
There are a variety of reasons that the nuclear industry objects
to any form of supplier liability, and instead, prefers channeling liability
solely to the nuclear operator. The primary justification is the belief that
it will lead to unlimited liability far “upstream” and that will cause many
nuclear operators and suppliers to become insolvent.18
There are also multiple policy objectives that make strict operator
liability attractive to the nuclear industry. It is cost-effective, in their view,
because nuclear operators are able to pass off the cost of potential future
accidents onto current and future users or purchasers of nuclear energy.19
Essentially, future damages are internalized into the price of production.20
The industry also argues that strict liability acts as an incentive for opera-
tors to follow safety standards and “implement state-of-the-art” techniques
to maintain the safest possible nuclear installation.21
A. Historical Context
The idea of shifting all liability in the event of a nuclear accident
or disaster was a product of the dominant lobbying power of the American
nuclear industry in the late 1940s and 1950s.22 After World War II, the
United States was the obvious preeminent power in nuclear technology.23
18 See Duncan E. J. Currie, The Problems and Gaps in the Nuclear Liability Conventions and
an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would be Brought Under the Current Existing Treaty
Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 85, 91–92 (2006).
19 See Kathy J. S. Fritz, Civil and State Liability for Nuclear Accidents: A Proposal for
Eastern Europe, 6 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 37, 60–61 (1994).
20 Id. at 61.
21 Id.
22 See Tom Vanden Borre, Channeling of Liability: A Few Juridical and Economic Views
on an Inadequate Legal Construction, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR
ENERGY LAW HARMONISING LEGISLATION IN CEEC/NIS 13, 17–18 (Nathalie L.J.T. Horbach
ed., 1999).
23 See id. at 19 (explaining how many Western nations were forced to rely on American
technological expertise in nuclear energy).
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Initially, the U.S. government was responsible for any liability caused
by a failure in nuclear technology, because at the time, nuclear plants,
reactors, and facilities were run by the government or the military.24 In
1954 the American government decided it was time for the private in-
dustry to be allowed to own, operate, and license reactors.25 This boon to
the industry came with a heavy price, as it meant the liability of third-
party actors (suppliers, designers, contractors, and manufacturers) would
also shift toward the private sector.26 This immediately became a huge dis-
incentive for the fledgling industry to develop new nuclear technologies—
specifically those focused on advances in civil nuclear energy—and so
investment in nuclear energy declined.27 At the same time, the American
nuclear industry was in the midst of trying to expand its supply market
into Western Europe.28 The burden of such liability was problematic be-
cause the American companies were unwilling to be liable for any nuclear
incidents that might occur across the Atlantic.29
B. Economic Channeling
The primary hurdle for the American private sector was insurance.
Due to the low-probability but high-risk nature of nuclear incidents, it is
very difficult to calculate insurance premiums.30 This is why the Price-
Anderson Act came into effect in 1957.31 The concept of economic channel-
ing was born and created as a quid pro quo type of arrangement.32 Nuclear
operators agreed to bear the burden of strict liability in return for a limi-
tation of liability over time, insurance coverage, manageable premiums,
and capped damages.33 This idea of economic channeling is the reason the
industry now has the insurance pools and operator schemes discussed
previously. Economic channeling differs from legal channeling in “that the
person causing the damage [e.g., the supplier] is in principle liable, but
24 Id. at 18.
25 See id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 19.
29 See id.
30 See Evelyne Ameye, Channeling of Nuclear Third Party Liability Towards the Operator:
Is it Sustainable in a Developing Nuclear World or is There a Need for Liability of Nuclear
Architects and Engineers?, 19 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 35 (2010).
31 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 18.
32 Ameye, supra note 30, at 35.
33 See id. (“[O]perators agreed to economically channeled and strict liability, a single forum,
a single applicable law and the obligation to hold financial security in return for limitation
of liability in amount and in time.”); see also Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 18.
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that only one designated person will bear the eventual economic burden
[e.g., operator’s insurance] . . . .”34 By contrast, legal channeling makes it
legally impossible for victims’ claims to be brought against a party respon-
sible for the damage (e.g., the supplier of a faulty reactor), because all the
liability has been shifted to another party.35
C. Legal Channeling
The famous Harvard Report by the Atomic Industrial Forum took
the principle of the economic channeling of liability to operators and trans-
formed it into a legal principle.36 The Harvard Report focused on the fact
that suppliers, contractors, and designers have no control over their goods
and services once ownership is transferred to the operators.37 Because of
this transference of complete control, it was concluded that liability should
transfer completely as well.38 The Harvard Report articulated twelve basic
principles of nuclear liability, the most pertinent principles being: limita-
tion of liability over time; limitation of damages; an exclusive forum; exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the state where the plant is located; and the obligation
to have insurance as a means of financial security.39
1. Judicial Efficacy
The Harvard Report listed various justifications for this new ap-
proach to liability—an approach that is in fact counter to most state tort
law. The main reasons presented were to avoid costly, duplicative, and
lengthy litigation; “to avoid an escalation of nuclear insurance costs;” and
to encourage investment and innovation in the nuclear industry.40 Attempt-
ing to meet the burdens of proof for claims seeking damages from the third-
party suppliers would be virtually impossible for the average plaintiff.41
The incessant litigation would become publicly detrimental to the victims’
34 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 27.
35 See id. at 27.
36 HARVARD LAW SCH. & ATOMIC INDUS. FORUM, INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL
PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR RISK (1959) [hereinafter HARVARD REPORT].
37 Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 20.
38 See id. (stating that fairness required the supplier to be relinquished from liability).
39 See Ameye, supra note 30, at 35.
40 Id. at 36.
41 See HARVARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 16 (providing suggested solutions for this
dilemma).
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cause, because it would have the appearance of malicious litigation and
harassment of the fledgling industry. Furthermore, the Report argued
that plaintiffs would purely be targeting the suppliers, rather than the
operators, because of their deeper pockets.42 Such threat of litigation would
dampen nuclear innovation, because, in theory, no company directly or
indirectly participating in the construction of a nuclear installation would
be absolutely immune under general law.43
2. Improves Victims’ Ability to Receive Compensation
The concept of exclusive jurisdiction and a single forum was argued
to be for the benefit of the plaintiffs because most large industrial defen-
dants have assets in various other countries—countries that often will not
support or accept American judgments.44 In addition, such presence in for-
eign nations could subject plaintiffs to confounding choice-of-law issues.45
Finally, the Harvard Report argued that limiting plaintiffs’ options would
also help avoid forum shopping, thus keeping the litigation in the state
where presumably the nuclear incident had the most impact.46 Having all
the liability channeled to the operator and requiring the location of the
operator to be the state of jurisdiction and the forum, the Report argued
that this provided the plaintiffs with the best means for recovering dam-
ages and experiencing a significantly higher percentage of success.47
3. Benefits to Public Safety and the Environment
The Harvard Report also took the time to address the concerns of
certain legislators with regard to the third-party suppliers’ almost com-
plete immunity from suit.48 The authors of the Report argued that this im-
munity would not result in neglect or ignorance of safety standards, as
42 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 20 (“[S]uppliers feared being prosecuted instead
of or jointly with the nuclear operator, even if their role was limited to calculations or
supervision of specific parts of the reactor, because the victim of a nuclear incident could
be compelled to sue as many companies as possible.”).
43 Id.
44 See Ameye, supra note 30, at 35; see also HARVARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 16.
45 See HARVARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 16.
46 See Ameye, supra note 30, at 36.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 38 (noting that the Harvard Report advocated that absent liability, suppliers
would maintain adequate safety measure for business reasons).
2011] INDIA’S NUCLEAR CIVIL LIABILITY BILL 229
was the concern of consumer protection groups, but, rather, would cause
“suppliers . . . [to] aspire to a high reputation in terms of quality.”49
Why would the suppliers aspire to such lofty and probably unprof-
itable goals? The Harvard Report argued that this would be purely a busi-
ness decision.50 Because operators bear the entire weight of liability in the
event of a nuclear accident or disaster, the operators would only want to
do business with the suppliers who had the reputation for being the best
and the safest.51 The operators would seek out the suppliers, designers,
manufacturers, contractors, and delivery companies that could offer them
the comfort of a solid reputation for safety compliance, and this in turn
would result in the operators acquiring their operating license from the
federal government faster.52 In addition, forcing the operator to bear the
burden of all liability would also force them “to maintain the highest stan-
dards of safety.”53 Finally, but most importantly, the operators’ insurance
premium rates would decrease significantly.54 And so, at the behest of the
U.S. nuclear industry, legal channeling was introduced to the world with
the aforementioned goals and interests at the heart of it all.55
There are numerous faults with this doctrine of legal channeling
of liability, but because it is a doctrine so entrenched in the nuclear com-
munity, critics are often overlooked or are few and far between. This is
especially true in the United States, where the concept of channeling found
its inception.56 In fact, this author’s primary frustration was the lack of
critical information available on a doctrine that so obviously flouts basic
tort law principles.57
II. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY DAMAGE COMPENSATION
REGIME
The basic principles of international nuclear law can be succinctly
reduced to the following: channeling liability exclusively to the operator of
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 Id.
52 Ameye, supra note 30, at 38; see HARVARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 57 (explaining that
suppliers’ safety concerns may be taken into account throughout the licensing process).
53 Patricia Goedde, In Search of a Civil Nuclear Liability Regime for North Korea, 27 ASIAN
PERSP. 225, 230 (2003).
54 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 20.
55 See id. at 20–21.
56 See id. (discussing how channeling of liability originated in contract law, specifically
indemnification and “hold harmless” classes used by the Atomic Energy Commission).
57 See infra note 222 and accompanying text (noting that legal channeling defies tort law).
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the nuclear installation; limiting the liability (amount, duration, and dam-
age type) of nuclear operators; requiring the operator to have insurance;
imposing strict liability upon the operator; and granting exclusive juris-
diction to the court of one country for a given nuclear incident or accident.58
A. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy (Paris Convention)
The Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy,59 most commonly known as the Paris Convention, was one of the
first nuclear conventions that dealt with liability issues in a post-nuclear
weapons world. It was passed by the Nuclear Energy Agency in 1960.60
The Convention covers damage or loss of life of any person or property that
is caused by a nuclear incident in a nuclear installation or by substances
from such installations.61 Any claims by parties injured in such an incident
must bring forth their claim within ten years of the injury or within two
years of reasonably discovering the injury (this, however, will be truncated
by the ten-year limitation clause).62 The claim must be brought against
the nuclear operator or the operator’s insurer and no other parties.63 The
jurisdiction of the court must lie within the state in whose territory the
incident occurred or where the operator was situated.64
The Paris Convention was the first international treaty to intro-
duce this concept of channeling liability to the nuclear operator.65 This
principle had two major implications: 1) only the nuclear operator can be
held liable for any nuclear accident that fell under the Paris Convention’s
purview; and 2) only the operator can be liable—meaning the operator
cannot seek financial recourse through third-party lawsuits, indemnity
actions, or other legal means.66 The Paris Convention essentially became
the only means in which plaintiffs could seek compensation. This became
58 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 15–17.
59 Paris Convention, supra note 7.
60 Id.
61 Id. at art. 3.
62 Id. at art. 8; see Fritz, supra note 19, at 44.
63 Paris Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6.
64 Id. at art. 13; see also Currie, supra note 18, at 104.
65 See Currie, supra note 18, at 87–88 (stating that the Paris Convention is one of the
foundational documents for the international nuclear liability regime).
66 See Fritz, supra note 19, at 41.
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known as “exclusive liability.”67 Plaintiffs were further limited because
the “maximum liability of the operator in respect of damage caused by a
nuclear accident [would] be 15 million Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”),
C15.518 million or $24.654 million . . . [and not] be less than 5 million
SDR, C5.173 million or $8.218 million.”68
B. Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention
The Brussels Supplementary Convention of 196369 amended the
original Paris Convention by providing additional avenues in which vic-
tims could collect damages. It increased the liability amounts by increas-
ing the contributions of the installation state to 175 million SDRs.70 The
Brussels Supplementary Convention was able to accomplish this increase
by requiring contributions from states with nuclear installations, who were
parties to the convention, to contribute based on their calculated installed
nuclear capacity.71 The more powerful and numerous the installations, the
greater share a signatory must contribute.72
By adding these additional layers of public funding, the Brussels
Supplementary Convention provided for a larger pool in which nuclear oper-
ators could dip into to cover damages. This could range from 175 million
SDRs to 300 million SDRs per incident (300 million SDRs equals roughly
$493 million).73 Like the Paris Convention, the Brussels Supplementary
Convention does provide nuclear operators an out if they become insolvent
or are unable to pay damages for other reasons by capping the damages
67 Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative
Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 234 (2008) (quoting Julia A. Schwartz, International Nuclear Third
Party Liability Law: The Response to Chernobyl, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE
POST CHERNOBYL PERIOD 41–44 (OECD-NEA, 2006)). Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”)
are a unit of currency used by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and the IMF also
sets the currency value of SDRs. Factsheet: Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), INT’L MONETARY
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
68 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, 234–35. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar
amounts shall refer to currency in United States dollars.
69 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960, NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY,
Jan. 31, 1963, available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlbrussels.html [hereinafter Brussels
Convention].
70 See Currie, supra note 18, at 105.
71 See id.
72 See id. (stating that some parties to the convention contributed based on the collective
nuclear capacity); see also Brussels Convention, supra note 69, at arts. 4(b), 12(a).
73 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 235; see also Currie, supra note 18, at 105.
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at the 300 million SDR mark.74 Arguably, the increase in the “money pool”
further justifies, in the minds of the nuclear industry, the necessity and
plausibility of channeling liability to only the operator.
C. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of
196375 is very similar to the Paris Convention, except it was drafted and
passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Vienna Convention
defines damage as a loss of life; “any personal injury or any loss of, or
damage to, property from a nuclear incident”; or damage arising from the
nuclear incident.76 In addition, like the Paris Convention, the Vienna
Convention has an armed conflict exception, and requires that operators
be insured.77 The insurance requirement is relatively small.78 However,
the Vienna Convention does not limit damage to that caused within the
territory of the installation state.79
As with the Paris Convention, the Vienna Convention limits
plaintiffs’ ability to raise a claim to within ten years of the incident (includ-
ing reasonable discovery).80 The Vienna Convention also engages in legal
channeling.81 Civil liability is restricted to the single operator entity who,
in turn, cannot seek financial recourse elsewhere.82 In addition to these
limitations, the likelihood that plaintiffs would receive complete recovery
for their losses is further restricted because the Convention allows the con-
tracting or installation state to weigh the interests of the victim against
those of the nation in relation to maintaining a consistent source of nuclear
energy.83 This means the state could limit recovery in the name of the
greater good.
74 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 235.
75 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Int’l Atomic Energy Agency
May 21, 1963, INFCIRC500, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents
/Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
76 Currie, supra note 18, at 101; see Vienna Convention, supra note 75, at art. I(1)(k).
77 See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, at arts. IV(3), VII(1).
78 See Currie, supra note 18, at 102.
79 See id. at 101.
80 See Fritz, supra note 19, at 43–44.
81 See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, at art. II(1); see also Currie, supra note 18, at
101 (explaining that an operator is liable “upon proof that the damage has been caused by
a nuclear incident”).
82 Bagely, supra note 1, at 536 n.171.
83 See Fritz, supra note 19, at 42.
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D. Protocol to Amend Vienna Convention
The 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention84 was the pri-
mary amendment to the Vienna Convention in the post-Chernobyl world.
The Vienna Protocol extended the geographical coverage of the convention
to include wherever suffering was caused by the nuclear incident as per the
discretion of the installation state.85 Damages now can be recovered for any
economic loss arising from loss of life, personal injury, or property damage,
but other types of economic loss can be recovered as well, such as fishing
or tourism, only if permitted under the civil laws of the installation
state.86 The Protocol also included environmental expenses as a recover-
able damage. This was coined as the cost of reinstatement of the impaired
environment, but, to be recoverable, the impairment and the reinstatement
must be significant.87
As mentioned earlier, the Vienna Protocol did expand the area in
which damages can be calculated.88 Part of this was due to the inclusion
of nuclear shipment accidents into the protocol.89 Damages could be re-
covered by coastal states and non-installation states when the accident
occurs within the “Exclusive Economic Zone” of a given jurisdiction.90
The Vienna Protocol also increased the compensation limits to
either 300 million SDRs or from 5 million to 150 million SDRs where pub-
lic funds are made available.91 This eliminates the need for the operator
to carry liability insurance, as long as the nuclear operator has at least
100 million SDRs underwritten by public funds.92 The drawback with this
option is that there are no requirements or qualifications the operator must
meet in order to opt out of insurance, such as solvency.93
Unfortunately, the Vienna Protocol maintains the exclusive and
strict liability of the nuclear operators, and it maintains jurisdiction pri-
marily in the country of occurrence or installation.94
84 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Int’l
Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Sept. 12, 1997, INFCIRC/566, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend.html [hereinafter
Vienna Protocol].
85 See Currie, supra note 18, at 86.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 86.
88 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89 See Vienna Protocol, supra note 84, at art. 6.
90 See id. art. 12; Currie, supra note 18, at 102.
91 See Vienna Protocol, supra note 84, at art. 7.
92 See Currie, supra note 18, at 102.
93 See Vienna Protocol, supra note 84, at art. 7.
94 Vienna Protocol, supra note 84, at arts. 6, 12.
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E. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
In 1997, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage (“CSC”)95 was created as a means for a supplementary
compensation fund to be available to signatories. It incorporates many of
the reforms that were called for in the wake of the Chernobyl tragedy.96
The fund is collectively provided by contributions from state parties.97 A
state’s contribution is calculated based on the state’s nuclear installation
capacity and a rate assessment conducted by the United Nations.98 The in-
stallation state shall ensure the availability of at least 300 million SDRs
($493.083 million).99 The CSC has not yet come into force, but any state can
follow it regardless of whether the state is a party to other existing nuclear
treaties or whether it has nuclear installations of its own.100
The CSC is not yet in force because it must have five states with a
minimum of 400 GW thermal of installed nuclear capacity ratify it.101 Thus
far, the United States is the only ratifying party with significant generating
capacity.102 It is argued that the primary incentive for states to join, includ-
ing non-nuclear states, is that the fund compensates for transboundary
damages, as well as a more expanded definition of nuclear damage.103 At
the same time, very few states have signed the CSC for a variety of reasons,
the primary reason being an unwillingness “to give up state sovereignty
95 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage, opened for signature Sept. 12, 1997, INFCIRC/567, available at http://www.iaea
.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc567.pdf [hereinafter CSC].
96 Goedde, supra note 53, at 232 (highlighting some of the changes, including “an increase
in compensation amount, a broader definition of nuclear damage, and treatment of mari-
time nuclear accidents”).
97 See CSC, supra note 95, at art. IV.
98 Id. at art. IV(1); Currie, supra note 18, at 89.
99 CSC, supra note 95, at art. IV(1); Currie, supra note 18, at 89.
100 See Currie, supra note 18, at 89.
101 CSC, supra note 95, at art. XX; see Liability for Nuclear Damage, WORLD NUCLEAR
ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html (last updated Aug., 2011).
102 Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 101. India announced it would sign the
Convention in October of 2010. See CSC Latest Status, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp_status
.pdf. This move was seen as an olive branch to the United States because India is not part
of any other nuclear treaty. See infra note 228. The current signatories are: Argentina,
Australia, Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, Morocco, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Ukraine, and the United States. See CSC Latest Status, supra.
However, only Argentina, Morocco, Romania, and the United States have ratified the CSC
and placed a deposit. Id.
103 See Goedde, supra note 53, at 233.
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on the issue of nuclear liability.”104 Another reason is due to the limited
access of compensation if an accident occurs in a non-signatory state.105 For
example, if an accident occurs in neighboring Pakistan but India suffers
damages, India can only recover under the CSC if Pakistan is a signatory.106
As mentioned before, the United States recently signed the CSC.
This was accomplished with the Energy Independence and Security Act107—
which created the funding mechanism in which the United States would
contribute to the international compensation regime.108 The United States
Treasury will act as the go-between for the nuclear suppliers and the CSC
fund. The Treasury will pay into the fund, but it will be reimbursed by the
suppliers.109 As mentioned previously, this is another example of the United
States government keeping the financial burden of the nuclear industry
in the private sector. By compensating the Treasury Department, the
United States can participate in the international nuclear liability system,
but not at the expense of burdening American taxpayers.110 Furthermore,
by becoming a member of the CSC, American nuclear suppliers are able to
participate in the retrospective pooling program to cover potential costs
from overseas nuclear incidents.111
F. Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention
The 2004 amendments to the Paris Convention,112 while similar
to those of the Vienna Convention, did not expand its parent treaty as
much. The Paris Protocol still requires the nuclear operators to maintain
insurance,113 and more relevant to this Note, it still requires exclusive and
strict liability for nuclear operators.114 In addition, it maintains jurisdiction
primarily in the country of occurrence.115
104 Id.
105 See id. at 237 (using South Korea as an example of a nation that would see little benefit
unless neighboring nuclear powers also signed the CSC).
106 See id. (applying the example of South Korea to an accident in India).
107 Energy Independence & Security Act, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934, 121 Stat. 1492,
1741–48 (2007).
108 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 247.
109 See Energy Independence & Security Act, § 934, 121 Stat. at 1744–46.
110 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 248.
111 Id. at 247 (quoting Energy Independence and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§ 934(a)(1)(D), 121 Stat. 1492, 1741 (2007)).
112 2004 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Energy Agency, Feb. 12, 2004, available at http://www.oecd
-nea.org/law/paris_convention.pdf [hereinafter Paris Protocol].
113 See id. at art. 10.
114 Id. at art. 2.
115 Id.
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Now under the Paris Protocol, the maximum liability for a nuclear
incident shall not be less than $1.112 billion,116 but it does allow the in-
stallation state to use its discretion to lower the threshold as the state
sees fit.117 The threshold could be lowered depending on the nature of the
incident, the nature of the nuclear installation involved, and the “likely
consequences” emanating from that installation.118
G. Protocol to Brussels Supplementary Convention
The Brussels Supplementary Convention was also revised post-
Chernobyl by its 2004 Protocol. The 2004 Protocol further increased con-
tracting parties’ contributions and raised the level of available collective
public funding.119
H. Maritime Laws
In light of the prior discussions regarding the different conventions’
approach to high seas accidents, coastal damages, and the global commons,
it is important to address quickly the Convention Relating to Civil Liability
in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Materials (1971),120 and the
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (1962).121 Both
of these conventions were drafted in the same vein as the Vienna and
Paris Conventions.122 This means that operators of a nuclear installation
are exclusively and strictly liable for damages when the nuclear materials
are being transported by sea.123
I. Insurance Pools
As mentioned throughout the sections of this Note discussing the in-
ternational regime’s and individual nations’ approaches to nuclear liability,
116 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 237.
117 See Currie, supra note 18, at 104.
118 See Paris Protocol, supra note 112, at art. 7(b).
119 See Currie, supra note 18, at 105.
120 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Material, Dec. 17, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 277.
121 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 57 AM. J.
INT’L L. 268, 268–78 (1963).
122 Peter Riley, The Legal Control of Nuclear Energy Between States, 21 CAL. W. INT’L. L.
J. 303, 322 (1991).
123 See id. (discussing Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime
Carriage of Nuclear Material (1971), and the Convention on the Liability of Operators of
Nuclear Ships (1962)).
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all the laws passed require nuclear operators to be insured.124 These in-
surers are actually nuclear insurance pools that operate “as a bundling of
resources at a national level.”125 Every country with an active nuclear mar-
ket has its own nuclear insurance pool. The member insurance companies
are able to determine individually what their yearly contribution will be.126
Such an approach allows even the smaller insurance companies to partici-
pate without risking their entire financial capital.127
Because these are domestic pools, a nuclear operator or supplier
is most likely going to be covered by the pool in its respective nation. The
insurance pool provides coverage for both first- and third-party liability,
however, the two liabilities are competing for the same resources.128 There
is some internal contention on this matter within the nuclear industry;
many believe first-party liability (e.g., damage to the plant) should be re-
moved because it unnecessarily increases premiums.129
Ironically, nuclear insurance operates counter to that of conven-
tional insurance. Because liability is channeled only to the operator, the
nuclear operator cannot defend itself by “asserting lack of negligence” or
claiming that financial responsibility lies with another party.130 The oper-
ator is still responsible for any accident or incident, even if it is caused by
the supplier’s negligence.131
III. SAMPLING OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY LAWS
As already discussed, the concept of legal channeling of liability
and limiting a right of recourse for the operator stems from the United
States’ desire to protect a fledgling nuclear industry in the mid-twentieth
century.132 The extent of this effort can be seen in the international con-
ventions133 that were circulated throughout Europe, all of which adopted
the same doctrines. In Europe, however, the motivation was more centered
on the Western European insurance sector’s inability or unwillingness to
offer comprehensive insurance coverage.134
124 See supra Parts II.A–G.
125 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 248–49.
126 Id. at 249.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 250.
129 Id. at 251.
130 Goedde, supra note 53, at 230.
131 Id.
132 See supra Part I.A.
133 See supra Part II.
134 See Ameye, supra note 30, at 41.
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However, there was resistance to the American-endorsed doctrine.
Fourteen now-member states proffered a joint amendment to the Vienna
Convention where the right of recourse was preserved if the fault of the
nuclear incident could be found in another party.135 The IAEA even dis-
cussed in its Explanatory Texts how “the principle . . . obviously favors the
manufacturer, supplier or carrier of the material or equipment, since it
obviates the necessity for them to take out insurance, as well as any other
person who may have contributed to the nuclear incident.”136 At the same
time, “Germany, Austria, and Switzerland actively argued against the prin-
ciple of legal channelling and supported economic channelling instead”
when debating the ratification of the Paris Convention.137 Because the
concept of legal channeling was included in the final draft, Germany and
Greece each included a reservation in their respective ratifications.138
A. Austrian Nuclear Liability Law
India is not the only country to pass an innovative nuclear liabil-
ity law that goes beyond what is set forth by the international regulatory
scheme. In 1998, Austria passed the Act on Civil Liability for Damages
Caused by Radioactivity.139 The scope of this law consists of allowing dam-
age recovery for environmental impairment.140 Environmental impairment,
in this context, is “any interference with the environment, which lastingly
alters [it] in such a way that it differs noticeably from natural processes
either in quantity, in quality or in the temporal respect,” and the cost of
preventative measures.141 Damages that occur in the ordinary course of
135 See id. at 41 & n.55 (discussing Amendment CN-12/CW/92 (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Greece, Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Austria, Portugal, Spain,
and Vietnam)).
136 Currie, supra note 18, at 93 (quoting IAEA, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage Explanatory Texts, page 11, IAEA Doc. GC(48)/INF/5 (Sept. 2, 2004)).
137 Ameye, supra note 30, at 41.
138 Id. (“Reservation of the right to provide, by national law, that persons other than the
operator may continue to be liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident on condition
that these persons are fully covered in respect of their liability, including defence [sic]
against unjustified actions, by insurance or other financial security . . . .”).
139 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE ZIVILRECHTLICHE HAFTUG FÜR SCHÄDEN DURCH RADIOAKTIVITÄT
[ATOMHG 1999] [FEDERAL ACT ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY RADIOACTIVITY]
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 [BGBL I] No. 170/1998 (Austria), available at http://www.oecd-nea
.org/law/legislation/austria/AUSTRIA-AtomicLiabilityAct.pdf (unofficial English version).
140 Id. at § 11(2).
141 See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, AUSTRIA: AUSTRIAN NATIONAL REPORT UNDER THE
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE
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operation are also included, but unlike most international conventions,
the Austrian Act does not require any particular nuclear incident to trig-
ger the statute.142 Rather, the Austrian Act’s primary focus is “to protect
its citizens.”143
While the law is far more limited than India’s recent bill, it does
address the issue of supplier’s liability. Unlimited strict liability is still
in play concerning the operators and carriers, regardless of where the in-
cident occurred or who is at fault.144 However, contractors and suppliers
of materials and parts can be held liable as well.145 This allows for plain-
tiffs to pierce the corporate veil and find the controlling company liable for
damages, not just the under-insured operating company.146 The Austrian
Act also does not implement any maximum liability amounts, and it re-
quires all nuclear carriers/operators in Austria to be insured.147 While a
plaintiff can file a claim against the supplier, the claim can be dropped if
the supplier can prove that sufficient compensation can be provided upon
completion of the suit against the operator.148 If this turns out to be untrue,
the suit against the suppliers would be reopened by the courts.149
Furthermore, to be even more inviting to plaintiffs, victims can re-
quire Austrian choice of law regardless of where the event occurred as long
as damage occurred in Austria.150 Previous Austrian law only allowed for
fault-based liability and nuisance law to be applied to foreign nuclear in-
stallations.151 In addition, the Austrian law expanded its definition of dam-
age in order to make the causality issue for plaintiffs easier to prove.152 The
law also allows claims to be directly brought against the nuclear insurers.153
The motivation behind the Austrian legislature’s decision to “flout”
international conventions is that legal channeling of supplier liability does
WASTE MANAGEMENT (May 2003), available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw
/conventions/austria-report-jc-first-review-meeting.pdf.
142 See Monika Hinteregger, The New Austrian Act on Third Party Liability for Nuclear
Damage, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 193, 196 (2006).
143 Goedde, supra note 53, at 238.
144 Hinteregger, supra note 142, at 196.
145 See Currie, supra note 18, at 123.
146 Hinteregger, supra note 142, at 196.
147 See Currie, supra note 18, at 122–23.
148 Hinteregger, supra note 142, at 197–98.
149 Id. at 198.
150 Ved P. Nanda & Jon M. Van Dyke, International Nuclear Law: An Introduction, 35
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2006).
151 Id. at 9.
152 Id. at 10.
153 See Hinteregger, supra note 142, at 197.
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more harm than good to plaintiffs, the public, and the environment.154
Austria is a non-nuclear state as per a 1978 state referendum155 (nuclear-
related activity is limited to three small research facilities156), but all its
neighbors operate commercial and state nuclear power plants: Germany,
Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Czech Republic.157 Furthermore, the legal
deficiencies exposed after the Chernobyl disaster made it clear that the
current nuclear legal regime did not supplicate Austria’s concerns.158
Interestingly enough, the Austrian law has not received as much
international play in the press, specifically the American press, because
Austria has prohibited the operation of nuclear plants in order to produce
electrical energy since 1978.159 Because Austria only has three small re-
search reactors, it is considered by the powerful nuclear industry to be a
non-market not worthy of risking such liability.160
B. Canadian Nuclear Liability Act
In comparison, Canada has a nuclear liability act more in line with
the flawed international regime. Canada’s Nuclear Liability Act (“NLA”)161
imposes some familiar restrictions and limitations on plaintiffs’ ability
to collect damages. The nuclear operator is subject to absolute liability162
that would otherwise be the burden of “upstream” suppliers to the nuclear
operators.163 The NLA has a statute of limitations of ten years after a nu-
clear accident in which claims can be brought by victims.164 Plaintiffs also
have a discovery period of three years (manifestation or discovery of the
injury and filing of a claim) that is limited by the ten-year framework.165
Similar to the international regime, the Canadian law imposes
caps on the total liability for which a nuclear operator is responsible.166
154 See id. at 194 (explaining that opposition to legal channeling was the primary impetus
behind rejecting both the Paris Convention and the CSC).
155 See id. at 193.
156 Id.
157 See Nanda & Van Dyke, supra note 150, at 1–2; Nuclear Power in Hungary, World
Nuclear Assoc., http://world-nuclear.org/info/inf92.html (last updated Feb. 2011).
158 Hinteregger, supra note 142, at 193.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 Nuclear Liability Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-28 (Can.).
162 See id. at § 4; Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Accident
Law, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 219 (1997) (“The liability of non-operators (suppliers,
manufacturers, and design consultants) is transferred completely to the operator.”).
163 Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 162, at 215.
164 See Nuclear Liability Act § 13.
165 Id.
166 See Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 162, at 219.
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For third-party claims arising after the nuclear incident, there is a limit
of 75 million Canadian dollars on the liability of a nuclear operator.167 Even
more troubling, if cumulative damages surpass $75 million, nuclear acci-
dent victims’ access to the Canadian courts is frozen.168 Finally, if it appears
that the claims will well exceed the $75 million limit, the Governor-in-
Council can call, in the name of the public interest, for a claims commission
to be created, and this commission would hear all the claims and authorize
prorated payments from a fund not to exceed $75 million.169
C. Chile
With respect to nuclear operators being held liable even for the
transport of nuclear materials by third-party carriers, Chile’s Law for
Nuclear Safety170 provides an interesting alternative. Rather than out-
right defying the legal channeling principle, the Chilean law alters the
definition of “nuclear operator” and makes any transporter of nuclear
substances and/or radioactive material—in Chile’s territorial sea, sur-
rounding sea, and Exclusive Economic Zone—by definition an operator.171
This means that liability cannot be passed off onto the plant operator,
but rather the transporters must be concerned with the prospect of being
subject to a lawsuit.172
D. United States’ Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act
Because the United States and India have entered into a marquee
nuclear partnership, it is important to briefly review how the United
States’ nuclear liability scheme is structured. The Price-Anderson Nuclear
Industries Indemnity Act of 1954173 (renewed in 2005 for twenty years174)
created a two-layer insurance system under which nuclear operators
function, and is based on the concept of economic channeling.175 A nuclear
operator is required to first have at least $300 million in liability insur-
ance from a private insurer,176 and in addition to that, a second layer of
167 Nuclear Liability Act § 13.
168 Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 162, at 219.
169 See Nuclear Liability Act § 18; Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 162, at 219.
170 Law No. 18302, Abril 16, 1984, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
171 Currie, supra note 18, at 123.
172 See id.
173 Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297 (2006).
174 Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 101.
175 Goedde, supra note 53, at 235.
176 Currie, supra note 18, at 120.
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insurance for each reactor.177 The secondary collective liability insurance
on the reactors was maxed at approximately $96 million per reactor plus
an extra five percent for legal costs, with a maximum annual retroactive
premium of $15 million per reactor per year.178 This was mandated by
Congress in an attempt to cover future excess claims.179
The double layer of insurance is required because nuclear oper-
ators are subject to strict liability in the event of a nuclear event.180 An im-
portant distinction is that the Price-Anderson Act channels this liability
through economic means (multiple insurance layers) rather than legal
means.181 Whenever there is an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence,” the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is given the opportunity to decide
if the nuclear operator can have access to tort law defenses that in effect
create the strict liability.182
After Three Mile Island, mutual insurance companies were created
to provide nuclear operators with insurance alternatives beyond what basic
insurance had to offer.183 Such insurance provides nuclear operators and
their related units insurance, which covers costs associated with electrical
generation issues caused by physical damage to the installation, decontam-
ination procedures, property damage, and other direct physical loss.184 As
a result, American nuclear suppliers and operators are insured threefold:
1) primary liability insurance coverage of $300 million; 2) a retrospective
premium of $96 million per reactor; and 3) a property insurance program
for nuclear electricity operators of up to $2.75 billion.185 However, it is still
questionable as to how much of this money would actually end up benefit-
ting the victims of a nuclear disaster.
It is also important to note that the Price-Anderson Act represents
a cognizant shift by Congress to move the burden of the nuclear industry
from the government to the private sector.186 This was accomplished by re-
quiring nuclear operators, licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
177 Id.
178 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 244.
179 Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (e)(2) (2006); see Currie,
supra note 18, at 120.
180 See Faure & Vanden Borre , supra note 67, at 241.
181 See id. at 242.
182 Id. at 241.
183 See id. at 254–55.
184 See NUCLEAR ELECTRIC INSURANCE LIMITED (NEIL), http://www.nmlneil.com/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2011); see also Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 255 (only avail-
able to nuclear electricity operators); Liability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 101, at 6.
185 See also Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 244, 255.
186 Id. at 242–43.
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(which was all of the operators in the United States), to pay a retrospective
premium or second layer of insurance.187 The criticism with the American
system is that nuclear accidents cause such high damages that companies
are more likely to go insolvent before they can pay either the victims or
the insurance pool for the funds it was unable to contribute.188 This leads
to concerns regarding how much of a deterrence impact does the Price-
Anderson system have on ensuring American nuclear suppliers and oper-
ators function reasonably and/or suffer consequences when an accident
occurs due to their negligence or mistake.189 These very concerns are ad-
dressed by the Indian legislature as a reason to include supplier’s liability
into the Indian nuclear framework.
IV. INDIA’S INCLUSION OF SUPPLIER’S LIABILITY TO THE NUCLEAR
LIABILITY DISCOURSE
India’s rise as a global power has made it an extremely lucrative
market, especially in the field of nuclear energy.190 As the most populous
democracy in the world, India’s energy needs far exceed its current ca-
pacity.191 Nuclear energy can serve as an efficient alternative, but at the
moment, there are only nineteen nuclear reactors in the country.192 The
influential Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to open up its international
vendor market to India in the fall of 2008, as a vote of confidence for nu-
clear industry investors.193 Since that vote India has signed numerous civil-
ian nuclear agreements, the most prominent ones with the United States,
187 See id. at 243.
188 See id. at 263 (“An important condition for a strict liability rule to be efficient, however,
is that the amount of compensation to be paid to the victim should be equal to the actual
damage caused by the operator.”).
189 Id.
190 See RAJYA SABHA, TWO HUNDRED TWELFTH REPORT ON “THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
NUCLEAR DAMAGE BILL, 2010,” DEP’T-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON SCI.
& TECH., ENV’T & FORESTS 4 (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads
/media/Nuclear/SCR%20Nuclear%20Liability%20Bill%202010.pdf [hereinafter STANDING
COMMITTEE REPORT].
191 See Krittivas Mukherjee, India Nuclear Plans on Track Despite Japan Crisis, REUTERS,
Mar. 15, 2011, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/15/idINIndia-55595220
110315.
192 ANDIRUDH BURMAN, LEGISLATIVE BRIEF: THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE
BILL, 2010, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (July 5, 2010), 2, available at http://www.prsindia
.org/uploads/media/Nuclear/Final%20Brief%20-%20civil%20liability%20for%20nuclear
%20damage%20bill.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE BRIEF].
193 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 4.
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France, and Russia.194 The advent of these agreements, and the fact that
India is not party to any international nuclear agreements or the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, forced the Indian parliament to draft a bill that pro-
vides compensation in the face of a nuclear accident.195
A. Text of Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill
Similar to certain international conventions, the Indian bill caps
total liability at 300 million SDRs.196 It limits the liability of operators to Rs
500 crore (approximately $109 million), but this cap only applies if the pri-
vate sector is allowed participation in the industry.197 Nuclear damage is de-
fined as including “loss of life or personal injury,” or “loss of, or damage to,
property.”198 Damage caused to the environment and economic loss result-
ing from environmental damage is included in the damage calculations.199
The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill addresses the issue
of third-party liability in its chapter on claims and awards.200 Clause 17
states:
The operator of a nuclear installation shall have a right of
recourse where . . . (b) the nuclear incident has resulted
from the willful act or gross negligence on the part of the
supplier of the material, equipment, or services, or of his
employees; (c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the
act of commission or omission of a person done with the
intent to cause nuclear damage.201
This clause allows for a right of recourse by the operator against a negli-
gent third-party supplier, thus making supplier’s liability a part of Indian
nuclear law.
194 See LEGISLATIVE BRIEF, supra note 192, at 2.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, No. 19 of 2010, INDIA CODE, ch. I cl. 6–7
(2010). Currently all of India’s nuclear power plants are owned by the state or by state-run
entities, but these clauses allow for joint ventures between the public and private sectors.
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 4.
198 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, ch. I cl. 2.
199 Id.
200 Id. at cl. 17.
201 Id.
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B. Legislative Intent Against Legal Channeling and for
Supplier’s Liability
“The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha202 on May 7, 2010 by
the Ministry of Science and Technology and Earth Sciences.”203 The orig-
inal version presented by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his party
was typical of what one can find with CSC, Paris, or Vienna-compliant
legislation.204 However, because the Prime Minister’s party does not have
the majority vote in the Lok Sabha, the bill was subject to many revisions
at the behest of the BJP.205 It was referred to the Standing Committee on
Science & Technology, Environment & Forests on May 13, 2010, and the
committee submitted a detailed report three months later.206 The Stand-
ing Committee provided several recommendations, but with reference to
clause 17, it recommended that 17(b) should be amended to say: “the nu-
clear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his
employees, done with the intent to cause nuclear damage, and such act
includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or
sub-standard services.”207
1. Minimize Inherent Risks and Protect Plaintiffs
The Standing Committee consulted the opinion of various heads of
Indian public and private sectors. The Non-Governmental Organizations
and Trade Unions were in favor of drafting clause 17 in a vein similar to
products liability law that would allow for suppliers to be “liable for product
202 For those not familiar with Indian politics, the Lok Sabha, also known as the House
of the People, is the lower house of the Indian Parliament, and it is where all the represen-
tatives are elected by direct vote (analogous to the U.S. House of Representatives). LOK
SABHA, http://loksabha.nic.in/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
203 LEGISLATIVE BRIEF, supra note 192, at 1.
204 Id. at 4–5 (explaining that one of the original reasons for introducing the bill was to
facilitate joining an international nuclear liability regime).
205 See BJP Refuses to Support Govt on Nuclear Liability Bill, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 23,
2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-08-23/india/28300486_1_patent-or
-latent-defects-supply-of-sub-standard-material-equipment-or-services. The Bharatiya
Janata Party (“BJP”) is the Hindu nationalist party, and is considered to be the more con-
servative of the two dominant political parties in the Indian Parliament. BHARATIYA JANATA
PARTY, http://www.bjp.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
206 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 1–2.
207 CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE BILL NOTICE OF AMENDMENTS, LOK SABHA
3 (Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Nuclear/Civil
%20Liability%20Govt%20Amendments%2021st%20Aug%202010%201.pdf.
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liability, faulty design, faulty manufacture, negligence, etc.”208 This was
partially based on the concept that any defects in the supplier’s technology
would not be noticed by the operator until after operation has begun.209
The Lok Sabha feared such negligent practices because legal chan-
neling, in practice, transfers liability onto the victims, and would not create
an industry that felt compelled to comply with safety measures. “Channel-
ing benefits the nuclear industry, and its suppliers, . . . but it prejudices
the victim as it limits the parties against whom they may claim.”210 This is
because the manufacturers, designers, suppliers, and transporters agree to
transfer all liability towards the operators in an attempt to limit damages
and costs, and ignore the basic social costs to victims.211 Rather, the “system
transfers liability to the . . . victims and . . . minimises incentives to take
safety precautions by maximising the value of liability protection of the
entire group.”212 The concern is why foreign suppliers would bother with
safety compliance if the system allows them to not suffer the consequences
of liability and offers them protection for any potential loss of income.
While it is acknowledged that these risks inherently exist in any industry,
the “negative incentive effects on both care and activity are magnified
correspondingly” when liability is channeled strictly to the operator.213
Critics of the bill in its infant form believed that taking a products liability-
type approach would help minimize potentially negligent practices by for-
eign suppliers far removed from the negative impacts a nuclear disaster
would have on the subcontinent.214
2. Reflect Indian Interest
The Committee was of the unanimous opinion that the bill’s primary
objective should be reflective of Indian interest and well-being.215 In pur-
suit of this objective, the Committee recommended that “there should be
clear-cut liability on the supplier of nuclear equipments/material in case
208 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 8.
209 See id. at 8–9.
210 Currie, supra note 18, at 93.
211 See id. at 93–94.
212 Ameye, supra note 30, at 38.
213 Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 162, at 233.
214 See Prabir Purkayastha, Nuclear Liability Bill: Subsidizing Foreign Suppliers With
Indian Money, DELHI SCI. FORUM (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.delhiscienceforum.net
/peace-and-disarmament/407-nuclear-liability-bill.html (describing why a products liability
approach eases liability for nuclear operators).
215 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 16 (similar to Austria’s motivations).
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they are found to be defective.”216 Unfortunately, the current “willful act or
gross negligence” requirement provides suppliers with a loophole as this
can be difficult to prove.217
The Committee also wished to bolster the victims’ means of find-
ing speedy and sufficient compensation by making the supplier’s liability
more clear and the cap significantly higher.218 The current nuclear regime
essentially created immunity for third-party suppliers, which is against
the interests and well-being of an installation state, in this case India.
Suppliers’ immunity from liability comes from the fact that “victims [are
unable] to invoke other civil legal bases [other] than the one that provides
for legal channeling. . . .”219 As mentioned previously, the Harvard Report
helped justify the creation of a system that enforces one jurisdiction, one
forum, and one legal doctrine—the doctrine of channeling and operator
strict liability.220
The counter-argument is that victims are denied the legal recourse
to sue all the parties that most likely contributed to a nuclear incident, and,
furthermore, the operators themselves cannot seek action against those
same contributing parties (suppliers, designers, etc).221 Channeling liability
exclusively to operators flouts basic tort law principles because it limits
a liable party’s ability to recover costs and/or pay greater damages to the
initial plaintiffs through an indemnity or third party lawsuit.222 Legal chan-
neling instead “interferes in the external extra-contractual relation between
the victims and the chain of liable persons [thus making] a number of com-
mon law tort actions legally impossible.”223 Such interference is contrary to
the Standing Committee’s objective of ensuring sufficient compensation
for victims.
3. Right of Recourse
By retaining the operator’s right of recourse in clause 17,224 victims
are no longer limited in their ability to recover costs through a third-party
216 Id. at 19.
217 Id.
218 See id. at 18.
219 See Ameye supra note 30, at 38.
220 Id. at 35.
221 See id. (providing the contrasting justification, and noting that suits against several
parties would open multiple avenues for payment).
222 Id. at 33–34.
223 Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 28.
224 See The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, No. 19 of 2010, INDIA CODE ch. IV,
cl. 17 (2010).
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or indemnification lawsuit by the operators. The right of recourse idea
harkens back to the quid pro quo arrangement of channeling liability; one
cannot reap the benefits of strict liability and channeling without sacri-
ficing one’s right of recourse.225 As the Indian legislature realized, this is
simply not true.
The doctrine of strict liability is not one with little clout or power.
Numerous industries have created systems that invoke strict unlimited
liability and channeling, but do not limit third party suits. Conventions in
the field of products liability, maritime law, and environmental law have
their own versions of legal channeling, but “none of these conventions
prevents the party to which liability is channeled to use his right of re-
course to recover compensation from any other party.”226 For example,
the International Conventional Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
channels the liability of damages resulting from pollution and casualties
involving oil-carrying ships to the registered owner of the ship.227 However,
it does not limit the ship owner from pursuing suits against manufacturers
in the event the accident was caused by a defect in the ship or the contain-
ment units holding the oil.228
While the current version of the bill does not reflect what was origi-
nally envisioned by the majority or the standing committee, the Indian
government has made it clear that the infant supplier’s liability clause will
not be removed from the bill, even though the Prime Minister has indi-
cated that India will be a signatory to the CSC (viewed as a move to pla-
cate American investors).229 It is important to note that the bill does not
preclude operators from waiving this right of recourse during contract nego-
tiations with suppliers, investors, etc.230 This is problematic as it could
effectively eliminate any benefits of having an available right of recourse.
C. Social, Economic, and Global Context
Exposure to liability is meant to act as an incentive for companies
to maintain compliance with standards and pursue safer advancements in
225 Ameye, supra note 30, at 34.
226 Id.
227 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, International
Maritime Organization, Nov. 29, 1969, art. III § 1, available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia
.edu/entri/texts/civil.liability.oil.pollution.damage.1969.html (entered into force June 19,
1975).
228 Id. at art. III § 5.
229 Siddharth Varadarajan, India Signs Nuclear Liability Treaty, THE HINDU (Oct. 28,
2010), http://www.hindu.com/2010/10/28/stories/2010102861770100.htm.
230 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, No. 19 of 2010, INDIA CODE ch. IV, cl. 17(a)
(2010).
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technology.231 If that liability is eliminated, then the incentive to produce
safe products is arguably diminished greatly. In addition, it can be viewed
in the public’s eye as allowing businesses to act in a vacuum where safety
and human life are valued less than insurance premiums and profit.232
Such was the opinion of the Indian public during the time the bill was in
debate in Parliament.233 As this Note has discussed, in the end such liability
channeling negatively impacts the citizens of developing nations or nations
seeking to expand their nuclear industry. Recent current events will further
enhance the discussion of supplier liability in the nuclear regime. The trag-
edy of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011 and the Fukushima
disaster are stark reminders not only of the awesome power of mother
nature, but of the risks of using nuclear technology and how legal chan-
neling of supplier liability further enhances this risk.
1. Bhopal’s Lasting Impact & Fairness to the Public
Around the time the bill was being debated in the Lok Sabha, the
Bhopal decision was released.234 Almost thirty years later, the victims of
this infamous industrial tragedy still suffer greatly due to lack of proper
compensation and medical rehabilitation.235 The timing of the decision
brought the disaster into the forefront of the Indian public’s eyes and argu-
ably bolstered the BJP in their push for strong supplier’s liability.236 The
231 See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 67, at 262.
232 The Civil Nuclear Liability Bill: Not in the Indian Interest, India Current Aff.(Aug. 18,
2010, 9:40 AM), http://indiacurrentaffairs.org/the-civil-nuclear-liability-bill-not-in-the-indian
-interest/ (using the Indian nuclear bill as an example of this concept).
233 See id. (underscoring the disdain for the removal of supplier liability in favor of assisting
U.S. companies).
234 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 8460/1996 (D. Bhopal June 7, 2010) (India)
(judgment upholding finality of 1989 settlement); see Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 273 (India) (Bhopal settlement with government of India). On February 14,
1989 the Supreme Court directed Union Carbide to pay up to $ 470 million United States
dollars to the Union of India in “full settlement of all claims, rights, and liabilities related
to and arising out of the Bhopal Gas disaster[.]” Madabhushi Sridhar, Is it Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage or Corporate Immunity for National Damage Law?: An Analysis of
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill 2010, INDIA CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 18, 2010, 10:00
am), http://indiacurrentaffairs.org/civil-immunity-for-nuclear-damage-indian-parliament
-offers-mncs-to-play-with-the-lives-of-indians/.
235 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 22 (dissent).
236 Bajoria, supra note 4 (noting the need for opposition support and timely issuance of
Bhopal decisions).
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Indian press, the Indian Atomic Energy Agency, the BJP, and, more impor-
tantly, the public were concerned the bill was becoming a tool for American
investors to be exempted from any sort of liability in the future.237 No one
wanted a repeat of the Bhopal disaster where Union Carbide only suf-
fered relatively minor liability while thousands of Indians and the Indian
countryside were left to suffer irreparable damage.238
The Indian bill faced much criticism in the Indian press because it
was viewed as an attempt to sell out by the Indian Prime Minister.239 As a
means to attract and appease investors, American investors in particular,
the first version of the bill was similar to the international regime, thus
allowing foreign nuclear investors to profit from the Indian market with-
out facing any responsibility or liability.240 Furthermore, because of the
very low cap, the view is that human life in India was being valued at a far
less amount than the lives of others abroad.241 For example, in the United
States, operator liability is capped at $11,900 million United States dollars
(“USD”), but state compensation is still unlimited.242 By contrast, the Indian
bill caps operator liability at $109 million USD, and state compensation at
$345 million.243 Fortunately, there does appear to be a feature in the Act
that could allow for civil suits to bypass the cap. Clause 46 states that “the
provisions of [the] Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any
other law.”244 It is arguable that a court could interpret that to mean if lia-
bility arising out of a nuclear incident went beyond the caps of the bill, it
could be covered under other Indian laws.245 This, however, is not certain.
As has been made painfully obvious in the press, foreign suppliers
are only concerned with whether they can be competitive in a burgeoning
237 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 22; see also Bajoria, supra note 4.
238 See Bajoria, supra note 4; see also Bhopal Disaster, Greenpeace, http://www.greenpeace
.org/usa/en/campaigns/toxics/justice-for-bhopal/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (highlighting
that Union Carbide’s settlement roughly worked out to $370 to $533 per victim, limiting
many victims’ ability to pay medical bills).
239 MANOJ KUMAR & LYDIA POWELL, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUND., CIVIL LIABILITIES FOR
NUCLEAR DAMAGES BILL 2010: THE WAY FORWARD 5 (2010), available at http://www.orfonline
.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ib_24_1282285648562.pdf.
240 See id.
241 Id.
242 LEGISLATIVE BRIEF, supra note 192, at 4 tbl.2.
243 Id.
244 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, No. 19 of 2010, India Code ch. VII, cl. 46.
245 Japan Disaster Revives Debate on Nuclear Liability and Safeguards: Expert Views,
BAR & BENCH NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 15, 2011), http://barandbench.com/brief/2/1405/japan
-disaster-revives-debate-on-nuclear-liability-and-safeguards-expert-views.
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market and how little liability exposure potentially results.246 They are
not concerned with the welfare of the Indian public or environment on a
subcontinent far away from company headquarters.
This mentality provides insightful context for the basic presumption
behind the industry’s support for channeling of liability to operators. The
primary reason for channeling is not the protection of the victims, but
rather it is needed to prevent a devastating rise in insurance costs.247 It
was first argued that operators would be in a better position and have more
incentive to compensate injured plaintiffs if they had the assurance that
parties further up the nuclear chain would in turn pay them damages.248
Suppliers in turn would be forced to enhance their compliance procedures
and work to ensure safer designs and equipment. However, the nuclear
regime has argued that the lack of supplier’s liability has kept insurance
premiums and costs for operators low because only the operator is required
to take out insurance.249 They argue that the catastrophic nature of nuclear
incidents is inherently difficult to insure, and thus would otherwise re-
sult in increasingly escalating premiums.250 As such, the industry believed
channeling of liability is needed. Scholars have recognized that channel-
ing liability creates artificially low premiums and does not solve the issue
of insurance capacity.251
It seems entirely contrary to fundamental concepts of fairness to
exonerate a third-party from liability purely because the party risks being
subject to a claim beyond its capacity or willingness to pay, and instead,
let the innocent public face the brunt of the consequences.252 This issue
of fundamental fairness was another reason the Lok Sabha found it jus-
tifiable to push so hard for supplier’s liability and a right of recourse for
the operator.253
246 See Bajoria, supra note 4 (“The United States has only one objective: to create a level
playing field for U.S. companies . . . The U.S. government is really indifferent . . . because
their only interest is to make certain that American companies are not kept out of the
competition because of these constraints.” (emphasis added)).
247 See Vanden Borre, supra note 22, at 35.
248 See Ameye, supra note 30, at 39.
249 See HARVARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 57.
250 See Ameye, supra note 30, at 39.
251 See id. In fact, during the ratification of the Vienna Convention, fourteen countries pro-
posed an amendment that would have required suppliers to take out insurance as well. Id.
252 See Simon Carroll, Perspective on the Pros and Cons of a Pooling-type Approach to
Nuclear Third Party Liability, 81 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 75, 85 (2008); Vanden Borre, supra
note 22, at 38.
253 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 25 (dissent).
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Because the BJP party controls the Lok Sabha, the bill was not
able to pass without including revisions that would create supplier’s
liability.254 As mentioned in prior discussion, the Bhopal decision was
released shortly before the bill was subject to vote, and critics in the Lok
Sabha reiterated that the first priority of the legislature should be the
interest of the Indian people, property, and environment.255 Because of
this, the current version of 17(b) and the liability caps are viewed by some
as completely inadequate.256 Many of these problems are beyond the scope
of this Note, but in the international context, the Indian law is the first
real attempt at moving beyond the burdensome yoke of legal channeling.
While this author does not purport to claim the bill is anywhere close to
being satisfactory when it comes to the idea of supplier liability, the very
fact that the nuclear industry’s suppliers are completely up in arms over
the clause is an indication that it is a step in the right direction.
2. Foreign Investor Fears
Foreign investors now fear they will be subject to liability years
down the line in the face of a nuclear accident, and American investors
worry that the playing field is no longer level for them.257 As a result, the
American lobbyists have been pushing hard on the Indian Prime Minister
to amend the bill.258
American investors’ fears reflect one of the basic tenants of lia-
bility channeling: the idea that nuclear investment would suffer greatly
if suppliers and manufacturers had to worry about liability costs. This
fear is illustrated quite well in the American press when discussing India’s
Civil Liability Bill.259 Keep in mind this same concern was one that was
initially raised during the inception of the nuclear industry when it was
still young and rising in the United States, let alone in other parts of the
254 Amita Shah, Supplier Liability to Save Nuke Bill, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-08-20/news/28472692_1_supply-of-sub
-standard-material-patent-defect-equipment-or-services.
255 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 190, at 25 (dissent).
256 See id. at 22–25.
257 See Bajoria, supra note 4.
258 See id.
259 See, e.g., Elana Schor, Japan Disaster Refuels Liability Debate in U.S.-India Nuclear
Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/25/25greenwire
-japan-disaster-refuels-liability-debate-in-us-59319.html; Rama Lakshmi, India Introduces
Controversial Legislation on Compensation for Nuclear Accidents, WASH. POST (May 8, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050705057.html.
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world. As such, the United States insisted upon channeling liability when
it first began to share its technology with Western European markets:
“Western suppliers are reluctant to enter into significant nuclear project
and safety upgrades, absent adequate protection. . . .”260 Western Europe
in turn applied the same channeling logic when it began to tap into the
Eastern European markets, perpetuating the doctrine with the expansion
of the industry.261
It is important to note that investment in India’s nuclear industry
has not suffered since the passage of the bill, as countries like France and
Russia continue to ink lucrative deals.262 As a concession to America’s fears,
Prime Minister Singh agreed to sign the CSC in October of 2010, but due
to opposition pressure and the Bhopal decision, the Prime Minister wisely
declared that supplier’s liability will remain.263
3. Current Events
As with most young, start-up industries, there are of course con-
cerns of liability. As discussed throughout this Note, the channeling doc-
trine clearly was created to protect the American industry, not society or
plaintiffs. Unfortunately, this mentality has done nothing to limit the in-
herent safety risks that nuclear energy and the nuclear industry create.
The tragedy of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011 and the
Fukushima disaster are stark reminders not only of the awesome power
of mother nature, but of the risks of using nuclear technology and how
legal channeling of supplier liability further enhances these risks.264
Japan, similarly to India, is not party to international nuclear lia-
bility conventions, but it has implemented its own nuclear civil liability
system. The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage,265 for the most
part, follows the same principles established in the third-party liability re-
gimes discussed in this note, most importantly channeling strict, exclusive,
260 Ameye, supra note 30, at 40 (citation omitted).
261 Id.
262 See Bajoria, supra note 4.
263 See Shah, supra note 254 (indicating significant backlash from the BJP if the supplier’s
liability clause was removed).
264 Rachel Armstrong, Japan Nuclear Crisis to Trigger Huge Civil Damages Claims,
REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/us-japan-tepco-liability
-idUSTRE7331xx20110404.
265 Act on Compensation of Nuclear Damage, Act. No. 147 of 1961, amended by Act No. 19
of 2009 (Japan), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan
-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
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and unlimited liability to the operator.266 It exonerates the operator for
damages caused by a “grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.”267
Like the other liability acts, it provides a statute of limitations and allows
for the government to intervene when cost of the damages exceeds the
operator’s capacity to pay.268 Furthermore, the Law was amended in 1994
to prevent the Product Liability Act269 from applying to nuclear damage.
All of these provisions in the Japanese law come into play when
dealing with the aftermath of the Fukushima failure. Granted, a natural
disaster was the cause of the damage, thus mooting the supplier liability
argument, the old and potentially faulty design of the reactors has received
coverage in the press.270 Hypothetically speaking, if there was a reactor
failure in Japan that was due to faulty design and not a tsunami, the
makers of the reactor (for example, General Electric) would still suffer no
liability.271 The entire cost of the damages would fall on the operator, and
if the operator cannot pay (as in the case of TEPCO272) the costs would fall
to the Japanese government, and ultimately to the Japanese taxpayers.273
In fact, it is estimated that the “Japanese taxpayers will pay as much 1 tril-
lion yen ($12 billion) to compensate businesses and individuals for damages
from the nuclear accident” because of the liability limitations in place in
Japanese law.274 These liability limitations are extremely similar to those
established in the various liability treaties and acts discussed in this Note.
This is a real example of the injustice and unfairness of the channel-
ing regime, and how it protects the industry, not the people, the environ-
ment, or the communities that surround nuclear facilities. It is painfully
obvious that the Paris and Vienna Conventions were created to protect
the emerging nuclear industries, and recent amendments have not altered
this outdated goal of promoting, protecting, and nurturing the nuclear
industry.275 However, it is questionable to view the nuclear industry now
266 Id. at §§ 3–4.
267 Id. at § 3.
268 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES:
REGULATOR AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, JAPAN 12–13 (2011),
available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan.pdf.
269 Id.; see Product Liability Act, Act No. 85 of 1994 (Japan).
270 Scott Malone, Analysis—Japan Crisis A Blow to GE, Reactor Design an Issue, REUTERS
(March 17, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/idINIndia-55640020110316.
271 See id.
272 Armstrong, supra note 264.
273 See id.
274 Japan’s Nuclear Disaster “Made in USA,” WORKERS WORLD 10 (Apr. 5, 2011), available
at http://www.workers.org/2011/editorials/japans_nuclear_disaster_0407/.
275 Carroll, supra note 252, at 81.
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as a young, burgeoning industry in need of protection, at the expense of
the public and environment.
CONCLUSION
The primary obstacle to nuclear energy development has always
been the fear of harm that can be caused by a tragic nuclear accident. The
Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill passed in August of 2010
attempts to reconcile the need for the public’s and Indian countryside’s
protection with India’s growing appetite for sustainable energy. While the
law has many flaws, it tries to provide victims with supplier’s liability, a
tool long removed from the nuclear industry.276
By analyzing the historical context and industry justification in
which legal channeling was first introduced into the nuclear liability
regime, it is clear this is an outdated concept not reflective of the growth
and power the industry has enjoyed. The current regime of channeling
liability strictly to the nuclear operator provides suppliers with no incentive
to ensure their products are not defective or sub-standard. Furthermore,
since this is no longer a fledgling regime, the need for protecting nuclear
suppliers has passed. Such liability protection is in fact counterproductive
to ensuring a safe nuclear facility less at risk for a devastating accident.
The Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill of 2010 reflects
how it is not necessary for high-density states like India to be at the whim
of the nuclear industry, but instead, must work to evolve the current re-
gime so as to protect their constituents and environment. Implementing
supplier’s liability against the nuclear industry is the first step in the
right direction.
276 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Bill No. 19 of 2010, INDIA CODE ch. IV, cl. 17
(2010); Shah, supra note 254.
